Persuasion in experimental ultimatum games
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Persuasion in experimental ultimatum games. / Andersson, Ola; Galizzi, Matteo M.; Hoppe, Tim; Krantz, Sebastian; van der Wiel, Karen; Wengström, Erik Roland.
I: Economics Letters, Bind 108, Nr. 1, 2010, s. 16-18.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Persuasion in experimental ultimatum games
AU - Andersson, Ola
AU - Galizzi, Matteo M.
AU - Hoppe, Tim
AU - Krantz, Sebastian
AU - van der Wiel, Karen
AU - Wengström, Erik Roland
N1 - JEL classification: C72, C91, D83
PY - 2010
Y1 - 2010
N2 - We study persuasion effects in experimental ultimatum games and find that Proposers' payoffs significantly increase if, along with offers, they can send messages which Responders read before deciding. Higher payoffs are driven by both lower offers and higher acceptance rates.
AB - We study persuasion effects in experimental ultimatum games and find that Proposers' payoffs significantly increase if, along with offers, they can send messages which Responders read before deciding. Higher payoffs are driven by both lower offers and higher acceptance rates.
KW - Faculty of Social Sciences
KW - communication in games
KW - cheap talk
U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2010.03.011
DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2010.03.011
M3 - Journal article
VL - 108
SP - 16
EP - 18
JO - Economics Letters
JF - Economics Letters
SN - 0165-1765
IS - 1
ER -
ID: 21332309