A complete characterization of infinitely repeated two-player games having computable strategies with no computable best response under limit-of-means payoff

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Standard

A complete characterization of infinitely repeated two-player games having computable strategies with no computable best response under limit-of-means payoff. / Dargaj, Jakub; Simonsen, Jakob Grue.

I: Journal of Economic Theory, Bind 213, 105713, 2023.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Dargaj, J & Simonsen, JG 2023, 'A complete characterization of infinitely repeated two-player games having computable strategies with no computable best response under limit-of-means payoff', Journal of Economic Theory, bind 213, 105713. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105713

APA

Dargaj, J., & Simonsen, J. G. (2023). A complete characterization of infinitely repeated two-player games having computable strategies with no computable best response under limit-of-means payoff. Journal of Economic Theory, 213, [105713]. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105713

Vancouver

Dargaj J, Simonsen JG. A complete characterization of infinitely repeated two-player games having computable strategies with no computable best response under limit-of-means payoff. Journal of Economic Theory. 2023;213. 105713. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105713

Author

Dargaj, Jakub ; Simonsen, Jakob Grue. / A complete characterization of infinitely repeated two-player games having computable strategies with no computable best response under limit-of-means payoff. I: Journal of Economic Theory. 2023 ; Bind 213.

Bibtex

@article{dc026571a66e4c8fb4e91be963b5a6f2,
title = "A complete characterization of infinitely repeated two-player games having computable strategies with no computable best response under limit-of-means payoff",
abstract = "It is well-known that for infinitely repeated games, there are computable strategies that have best responses, but no computable best responses. These results were originally proved for either specific games (e.g., Prisoner's dilemma), or for classes of games satisfying certain conditions not known to be both necessary and sufficient. We derive a complete characterization in the form of simple necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a computable strategy without a computable best response under limit-of-means payoff. We further refine the characterization by requiring the strategy profiles to be Nash equilibria or subgame-perfect equilibria, and we show how the characterizations entail that it is efficiently decidable whether an infinitely repeated game has a computable strategy without a computable best response.",
keywords = "Best response strategies, Computability, Limit-of-means payoff, Repeated games, Subgame-perfect equilibria",
author = "Jakub Dargaj and Simonsen, {Jakob Grue}",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2023 Elsevier Inc.",
year = "2023",
doi = "10.1016/j.jet.2023.105713",
language = "English",
volume = "213",
journal = "Journal of Economic Theory",
issn = "0022-0531",
publisher = "Academic Press",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - A complete characterization of infinitely repeated two-player games having computable strategies with no computable best response under limit-of-means payoff

AU - Dargaj, Jakub

AU - Simonsen, Jakob Grue

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2023 Elsevier Inc.

PY - 2023

Y1 - 2023

N2 - It is well-known that for infinitely repeated games, there are computable strategies that have best responses, but no computable best responses. These results were originally proved for either specific games (e.g., Prisoner's dilemma), or for classes of games satisfying certain conditions not known to be both necessary and sufficient. We derive a complete characterization in the form of simple necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a computable strategy without a computable best response under limit-of-means payoff. We further refine the characterization by requiring the strategy profiles to be Nash equilibria or subgame-perfect equilibria, and we show how the characterizations entail that it is efficiently decidable whether an infinitely repeated game has a computable strategy without a computable best response.

AB - It is well-known that for infinitely repeated games, there are computable strategies that have best responses, but no computable best responses. These results were originally proved for either specific games (e.g., Prisoner's dilemma), or for classes of games satisfying certain conditions not known to be both necessary and sufficient. We derive a complete characterization in the form of simple necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a computable strategy without a computable best response under limit-of-means payoff. We further refine the characterization by requiring the strategy profiles to be Nash equilibria or subgame-perfect equilibria, and we show how the characterizations entail that it is efficiently decidable whether an infinitely repeated game has a computable strategy without a computable best response.

KW - Best response strategies

KW - Computability

KW - Limit-of-means payoff

KW - Repeated games

KW - Subgame-perfect equilibria

U2 - 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105713

DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105713

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:85168727575

VL - 213

JO - Journal of Economic Theory

JF - Journal of Economic Theory

SN - 0022-0531

M1 - 105713

ER -

ID: 371569990