Multi-block MEV

Research output: Working paper › Preprint › Research

Standard

Multi-block MEV. / Jensen, Johannes Rude; von Wachter, Carl Victor; Ross, Omry.

arXiv preprint, 2023.

Research output: Working paper › Preprint › Research

Harvard

Jensen, JR, von Wachter, CV & Ross, O 2023 'Multi-block MEV' arXiv preprint.

APA

Jensen, J. R., von Wachter, C. V., & Ross, O. (2023). Multi-block MEV. arXiv preprint.

Vancouver

Jensen JR, von Wachter CV, Ross O. Multi-block MEV. arXiv preprint. 2023.

Author

Jensen, Johannes Rude ; von Wachter, Carl Victor ; Ross, Omry. / Multi-block MEV. arXiv preprint, 2023.

Bibtex

@techreport{0838eeb25a114266a13b5d1e0ead6311,
title = "Multi-block MEV",
abstract = "Multi-block MEV (MMEV) denotes the practice of securing k-consecutive blocks in an attempt at extracting surplus value by manipulating transaction ordering. Following the implementation of pro-poser/builder separation (PBS) on Ethereum, savvy builders can secure consecutive block space by implementing targeted bidding strategies through relays. To estimate the extent to which this practice might be taking place today, we collect data on all bids submitted by builders through relays in the period from the 15th of September (the merge) 2022 until the 31st of January 2023. We hypothesize that builders might secure consecutive blocks in order to deploy sophisticated MMEV strategies, such as creating artificial momentum in Uniswap pools, by withholding and prioritizing transactions from the mempool. In this talk proposal, we present preliminary and non-conclusive results, indicating the builders employ super-linear bidding strategies to secure consecutive block space. We hypothesize that builders act rationally and increase bids only if this is profitable. With this WIP talk proposal, we hope to stimulate an interesting discussion on the feasibility of sophisticated MMEV strategies at SBC23, with the aim of collecting feedback from researchers and practitioners working on MEV.",
author = "Jensen, {Johannes Rude} and {von Wachter}, {Carl Victor} and Omry Ross",
year = "2023",
language = "English",
publisher = "arXiv preprint",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "arXiv preprint",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Multi-block MEV

AU - Jensen, Johannes Rude

AU - von Wachter, Carl Victor

AU - Ross, Omry

PY - 2023

Y1 - 2023

N2 - Multi-block MEV (MMEV) denotes the practice of securing k-consecutive blocks in an attempt at extracting surplus value by manipulating transaction ordering. Following the implementation of pro-poser/builder separation (PBS) on Ethereum, savvy builders can secure consecutive block space by implementing targeted bidding strategies through relays. To estimate the extent to which this practice might be taking place today, we collect data on all bids submitted by builders through relays in the period from the 15th of September (the merge) 2022 until the 31st of January 2023. We hypothesize that builders might secure consecutive blocks in order to deploy sophisticated MMEV strategies, such as creating artificial momentum in Uniswap pools, by withholding and prioritizing transactions from the mempool. In this talk proposal, we present preliminary and non-conclusive results, indicating the builders employ super-linear bidding strategies to secure consecutive block space. We hypothesize that builders act rationally and increase bids only if this is profitable. With this WIP talk proposal, we hope to stimulate an interesting discussion on the feasibility of sophisticated MMEV strategies at SBC23, with the aim of collecting feedback from researchers and practitioners working on MEV.

AB - Multi-block MEV (MMEV) denotes the practice of securing k-consecutive blocks in an attempt at extracting surplus value by manipulating transaction ordering. Following the implementation of pro-poser/builder separation (PBS) on Ethereum, savvy builders can secure consecutive block space by implementing targeted bidding strategies through relays. To estimate the extent to which this practice might be taking place today, we collect data on all bids submitted by builders through relays in the period from the 15th of September (the merge) 2022 until the 31st of January 2023. We hypothesize that builders might secure consecutive blocks in order to deploy sophisticated MMEV strategies, such as creating artificial momentum in Uniswap pools, by withholding and prioritizing transactions from the mempool. In this talk proposal, we present preliminary and non-conclusive results, indicating the builders employ super-linear bidding strategies to secure consecutive block space. We hypothesize that builders act rationally and increase bids only if this is profitable. With this WIP talk proposal, we hope to stimulate an interesting discussion on the feasibility of sophisticated MMEV strategies at SBC23, with the aim of collecting feedback from researchers and practitioners working on MEV.

M3 - Preprint

BT - Multi-block MEV

PB - arXiv preprint

ER -

ID: 384342497