In the span of just a few years, decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) have grown into a high-value form of organization. A growing body of IS literature examines the decentralized, transparent, and equitable design of these organizations. DAO governance is commonly mediated using ‘governance tokens’ in a one-token-one-vote system. However, the inconspicuous role of tokens for DAO governance is rarely investigated. We present preliminary findings from a netnographic study of controversial decision-making processes in two large DAOs. Our cases reveal how top holders of tokens leverage their favorable position to enact unpopular decisions unilaterally. The findings indicate a discrepancy between the espoused values and enacted practices of DAO governance, as economic capital rather than social capital investment becomes the primary determinant of voting power. We examine emerging alternative voting systems and offer a framework for parsing these new initiatives. Contributions to the literature and future work are discussed.