Strategic ignorance of health risk: its causes and policy consequences
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Strategic ignorance of health risk : its causes and policy consequences. / Nordström, Jonas; Thunström, Linda; van 't Veld, Klaas; Shogren, Jason. F. ; Ehmke, Mariah.
In: Behavioural Public Policy, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2023, p. 83-114.Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Strategic ignorance of health risk
T2 - its causes and policy consequences
AU - Nordström, Jonas
AU - Thunström, Linda
AU - van 't Veld, Klaas
AU - Shogren, Jason. F.
AU - Ehmke, Mariah
PY - 2023
Y1 - 2023
N2 - We examine the causes and policy implications of strategic (willful) ignorance of risk as an excuse to over-engage in risky health behavior. In an experiment on Copenhagen adults, we allow subjects to choose whether to learn the calorie content of a meal before consuming it and then measure their subsequent calorie intake. Consistent with previous studies, we find strong evidence of strategic ignorance: 46% of subjects choose to ignore calorie information, and these subjects subsequently consume more calories on average than they would have had they been informed. While previous studies have focused on self-control as the motivating factor for strategic ignorance of calorie information, we find that ignorance in our study is instead motivated by optimal expectations – subjects choose ignorance so that they can downplay the probability of their preferred meal being high-calorie. We discuss how the motivation matters to policy. Further, we find that the prevalence of strategic ignorance largely negates the effects of calorie information provision: on average, subjects who have the option to ignore calorie information consume the same number of calories as subjects who are provided no information.
AB - We examine the causes and policy implications of strategic (willful) ignorance of risk as an excuse to over-engage in risky health behavior. In an experiment on Copenhagen adults, we allow subjects to choose whether to learn the calorie content of a meal before consuming it and then measure their subsequent calorie intake. Consistent with previous studies, we find strong evidence of strategic ignorance: 46% of subjects choose to ignore calorie information, and these subjects subsequently consume more calories on average than they would have had they been informed. While previous studies have focused on self-control as the motivating factor for strategic ignorance of calorie information, we find that ignorance in our study is instead motivated by optimal expectations – subjects choose ignorance so that they can downplay the probability of their preferred meal being high-calorie. We discuss how the motivation matters to policy. Further, we find that the prevalence of strategic ignorance largely negates the effects of calorie information provision: on average, subjects who have the option to ignore calorie information consume the same number of calories as subjects who are provided no information.
KW - Faculty of Science
KW - strategic ignorance
KW - willful ignorance
KW - optimal expectations
KW - calories
KW - information
KW - labling
KW - restaurant
KW - Faculty of Social Sciences
KW - strategic ignorance
KW - willful ignorance
KW - risk perception
KW - optimal expectations
KW - calories
KW - restaurant
KW - information
KW - labeling
U2 - 10.1017/bpp.2019.52
DO - 10.1017/bpp.2019.52
M3 - Journal article
VL - 7
SP - 83
EP - 114
JO - Behavioural Public Policy
JF - Behavioural Public Policy
SN - 2398-063X
IS - 1
ER -
ID: 235073561